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SELF-REGULATION, MARKETING
COMMUNICATIONS AND CHILDHOOD
OBESITY: A CRITICAL REVIEW
FROM NEW ZEALAND
Janet Hoek*
Ninya Maubach"
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over children's exposure to food advertising and its
effects on their behavior has raised many important questions about
how marketing communications are regulated and whether these
regulations are adequate. Advertisers argue strongly for self-regu-
lation, where advertisers themselves develop and promulgate codes
of practice and deal with any alleged breaches.'
* Janet Hoek, Professor of Marketing, Massey University, New Zealand.
Professor Hoek has a particular interest in marketing regulation and has written
extensively on the regulation of tobacco promotions and the ethics and effects
of food advertising. She has also published several papers on the measurement
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intellectual property cases. Her work has been published in the Journal of
Public Policy & Marketing; Public Opinion Quarterly; Journal of Business
Research and the International Journal of Market Research.
*" Ninya Maubach, Ph.D. Candidate in Marketing, Massey University, New
Zealand; Bachelor of Science, with a major in Psychology, and Bachelor of
Business Studies, Massey University, New Zealand. Ninya was awarded a
post-graduate Massey Scholarship and a Massey Doctoral Scholarship in
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She is interested in marketing regulation and public policy, and her Ph.D.
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New Zealand Medical Journal.
1. See Debra Harker & Glen Wiggs, Three Generations of Advertising
Self-Regulation: Learning from Our Forefathers, 11 MARKETING BULL. 1, 1
(2000), http://marketing-bulletin.massey.ac.nz/author.asp?aid=78.
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Some academic researchers have supported this approach, sug-
gesting it helps advertisers "internalize" accepted social values while
promoting "moral adhesion" to these values.2 Even strong propo-
nents of self-regulation, however, acknowledge that self-regulation
may not be an appropriate model where the consequences of regu-
latory failure are serious.
3
Concern about the consequences of regulatory failure has led
others, particularly those associated with health groups, to claim that
the self-interest of participants undermines self-regulation. 4 These
researchers argue that only robust government intervention can
provide dispassionate and effective oversight of advertising.
5
The debate over self-regulation has appeared in many contexts,
but is most profound when vulnerable audiences, such as children,
and adverse health consequences, such as obesity, are at stake.6 To
explore the effect of food advertising on children further, this Article
critically reviews the self-regulation of marketing communications
and examines the extent to which industry oversight of advertising
affords adequate protection to vulnerable consumer groups. This
Article also explores how marketing communications shape young
people's behavior and explains why government intervention is
necessary to control the adverse health consequences linked to
marketing activities.
II. SELF-REGULATION OF MARKETING COMMUNICATIONSI
In many Western democracies, legislation promotes advertisers'
rights to communicate with the public. For example, the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects commercial speech, 7 as
2. Jean Boddewyn, Advertising Self-Regulation: True Purpose and Limits,
18 J. ADVERTISING 19, 20 (1989).
3. Id. at 21.
4. See Sandra Jones & Robert Donovan, Self-Regulation of Alcohol
Advertising: Is It Workingfor Australia?, 2 J. PUB. AFF. 153, 163 (2002).
5. See David Garvin, Can Industry Self-Regulation Work?, 25 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 37, 46-48 (1983); see also Jones & Donovan, supra note 4, at
164 (arguing that, for decisions regarding complaints about alcohol adver-
tisements, case reports should include why the advertisements were or were
not forwarded to the formal complaints panel or management committee).
6. Janet Hock & Philip Gendall, Advertising and Obesity: A Behavioral
Perspective, 2006, J. HEALTH COMM. (forthcoming).
7. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (establishing that the First Amendment protects commercial
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does the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.8 Accordingly,
governments have been wary of limiting commercial rights via
legislation.9  To fill what would otherwise be a regulatory void,
advertisers have developed industry-funded regulatory procedures
that have preempted or forestalled government regulation.'" As
researchers have noted, self-regulation averts or, at least, ameliorates
the threat of government intervention and typically results in more
benign oversight. "
Self-regulatory systems recognize the pervasiveness of mar-
keting communications and the need to ensure that the overall
content, tone, and presentation of these communications meet
general standards of acceptability.12 Furthermore, architects of self-
regulatory models also accept that because some advertisements are
either intentionally or inadvertently misleading, offensive, or irre-
sponsible, the industry needs a fair and robust process to address
consumers' concerns about specific advertisements.'
3
A. Asserted Benefits of Self-Regulation
Despite general agreement on the desirability of regulation, the
precise form of oversight that advertising should take remains in
dispute. Irrespective of the approach taken, those responsible for
setting and maintaining advertising standards face difficulties when
defining nebulous concepts such as "good taste" and "social
decency." The problems arise because views on certain moral topics
speech if it is not misleading; if the government interest is substantial; if the
regulation directly advances the government interest; and if it is not more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest).
8. See Simon Kellett, Privacy Special Issue: Legislative Definition of
Spam for New Zealand, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. (N.Z.) 607, 625
(2005) (stating that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 protects anything
written or said, regardless of the nature of the particular communication or the
context in which it occurs).
9. See Debra Harker, Towards Effective Advertising Self-Regulation in
Australia: The Seven Components, 9 J. MARKETING COMM. 93, 94 (2003).
10. See Garvin, supra note 5, at 41-42.
11. See id. at 42; cf Debra Harker & Michael Harker, Establishing New
Advertising Self-Regulatory Schemes: A Comparison of the UK and Australian
Approaches, 59 AUST. J. PUB. ADMIN. 56, 59 (2000) (noting that advertisers in
the U.K. and Australia are enthusiastic self-regulators because of the threat of
government regulation).
12. See Harker & Wiggs, supra note 1, at 2.
13. Id. at 1.
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evolve over time and existing values are inherently diverse within a
community.
14
In addition, researchers remain divided over whether self-
regulation is sufficiently robust to ensure that advertising meets the
standards designed to protect vulnerable groups from harm.
Professor David Garvin noted, "[S]elf-regulation does not have to be
perfect; it need only 'elevate the performance of the industry to the
point where it does not represent a relatively attractive target to the
resource-constrained regulatory agency'."' 5 To critics of self-regu-
lation, however, comments such as these appear to reinforce their
concerns that industry monitoring of its own activities is little more
than an attempt to set standards so liberal that they afford minimal
protection to consumers.
Despite concerns over whether self-regulation is an appropriate
approach to maintaining advertising standards, proponents argue that
it has the potential to deliver several benefits. First, self-regulation is
more efficient and results in higher levels of compliance than
government regulation.' 6 In addition, self-regulation is funded by
the industry to which it applies, thus avoiding the need for
government expenditure on regulation.' 7 Moreover, because self-
regulation draws on the knowledge of industry members to assess
complaints, it is said to bring a higher level of expertise to decision
making.' 8 Finally, effective self-regulation is said to work alongside,
and not instead of, government regulation. 19 Thus, while govern-
ment regulation may establish broad social objectives or constraints,
the manner in which these regulations are realized or applied is
determined by the affected industry.
20
14. See Boddewyn, supra note 2, at 25.
15. Garvin, supra note 5, at 42-43.
16. See Thomas R. Wotruba, Industry Self-Regulation: A Review and
Extension to a Global Setting, 16 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 38, 40 (1997).
17. See id. at 42.
18. See id. at 42.
19. See id. at 40.
20. See Jean J. Boddewyn, Advertising Self-Regulation: Private Govern-
ment and Agent of Public Policy, 4 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 129, 130-31
(1985).
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B. Proposed Characteristics of the Ideal Self-Regulation Model
Researchers examining the efficacy of self-regulatory systems
have documented the characteristics they believe these systems
should possess. First, the systems themselves should be well
funded, which would allow wide dissemination of decisions to both
practitioners and the public.22 Complaints boards must clearly com-
municate the results of their deliberations to stakeholders if they are
to help establish precedents that can guide future advertising and
promotional developments. 23 Furthermore, ensuring that the public
is aware of complaint outcomes maintains awareness of the
complaints service and highlights the range of issues addressed.24
Second, a series of clearly written codes must exist. These are
often developed in conjunction with interested parties, including
regulators, interest groups, industry representatives and the public,
and are subject to regular review and revision, to reflect changing
social norms.25 However, the responsibility for developing the codes
lies with the advertising industry, thereby rendering the extent to
which these codes reflect wider community interests and concerns
moot.
Third, effective self-regulation depends on interested parties,
including consumers, traders and industry representatives, and other
regulators, being aware of the codes' existence and encouraged to
submit complaints.26 Thus, people representing a broad range of
interests are both aware of and able to participate in the complaints
process. Wide distribution of the codes assists potential com-
plainants with framing their concerns and helps ensure that com-
plaints are clearly heard and considered.27 Arguably, dissemination
of the codes and solicitation of complaints is not in self-regulators'
interests, as it would increase their workload and the expense of
21. See Harker, supra note 9, at 97; Debra Harker, Educating to Improve
the Effectiveness of Advertising Self-Regulatory Schemes: The Case of
Australia, 26 J. CURRENT ISSUES & REs. ADVERTISING 69, 71 (2004)
[hereinafter Harker, Educating to Improve].
22. See Harker, supra note 9, at 99.
23. See id. at 104.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 100-01.
26. See Boddewyn, supra note 2, at 24-25.
27. See Harker, supra note 9, at 104-05.
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maintaining the system itself.28 Moreover, even if the complaints
procedures are "user-friendly", the need to provide personal details,
and the fact that these details will be published in decisions, may
deter some complainants.
To broaden the range of complaints received and considered, Dr.
Debra Harker suggests that screening procedures ought not to be
employed since they would reduce the complaints body's exposure
to the full range of concerns that exist in the wider community.
29
Nevertheless, screening procedures appear to be widely used and the
adjudicating body does not hear many of the submitted complaints.
30
Once complaints have been received and registered, best
practice guidelines suggest the complaints body should be comprised
of equal representation from industry and the public.31 This body
should follow the principles of natural justice in its deliberations and
allow the advertiser, agency, and other interested parties an oppor-
tunity to respond to the complaint.32 However, researchers have
questioned whether, in practice, complaints boards adequately repre-
sent the lay public, whose views should form the reference point
against which all decisions should be tested.33
The guidelines also suggest that if a complaint is upheld a
penalty should be imposed. The nature of the penalty, however, has
attracted increasing attention; critics have argued that requiring
advertisers to withdraw an advertisement when it has already
concluded its media schedule can hardly be considered a penalty.
34
Furthermore, critics suggest "penalties" that have no material effect
provide no incentive to comply with principles outlined in the self-
regulatory codes.
35
28. See Boddewyn, supra note 2, at 25.
29. See Harker, Educating to Improve, supra note 21, at 71.
30. See Harker, supra note 9, at 101.
31. See id. at 102.
32. See id. at 97.
33. See Harker, Educating to Improve, supra note 21, at 72-73 (noting that
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, a public watchdog
group concerned with implementing Australia's Trade Practices Act, found the
Media Council of Australia exhibited a lack of responsiveness to changes in
community needs).
34. See Gayle Kerr & Cheryl Moran, Any Complaints? A Review of the
Framework of Self-Regulation in the Australian Advertising Industry, 8 J.
MARKETING COMM. 189, 192, 201 (2002).
35. Id. at 201.
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Harker's compilation of self-regulatory traits also includes the
need to undertake periodic and independent audits of the systems put
in place to govern advertising conduct.36 These reviews should test
awareness of the complaints system, as well as satisfaction with the
complaints resolution process. Ideally, these reviews would be made
public so all interested stakeholders could evaluate for themselves
the merits of the self-regulatory system used to adjudicate com-
plaints.
The final two features Harker argues should be part of self-
regulatory systems are creation of public awareness and education,
particularly the need to ensure that industry representatives are aware
of the required standards and precedent setting decisions.3 7 As noted
earlier, public awareness is achieved via publicizing the complaints
body's decisions and through informing the public about the codes,
usually through mass media advertising.3 8  Publicizing decisions,
however, provides no guarantee that the media will feature the
decisions prominently, nor does it ensure that the industry will heed
any cautions issued.
C. Compliance with Proposed Characteristics:
Analysis of the Australian and New Zealand Models
Few would disagree that there is a need for self-regulatory
systems to include the attributes advocated by Harker. However, the
extent to which advertising self-regulation models comply with
Harker's recommended framework remains debatable. In a review
of the self-regulatory system in place in Australia prior to 1997,
Harker concluded that it fell far short of the standards academic
researchers have suggested should be mandatory. 39 For example,
Harker noted that, the regulatory body's chairperson excluded around
fifty percent of the complaints received from full review4° on the
grounds that they did not establish a prima facie case, or because
they were deemed frivolous or trivial.4'
36. See Harker, supra note 9, at 97-98, 103-04.
37. Id. at 98, 104.
38. Id. at 98, 104-05.
39. See Harker, Educating to Improve, supra note 21, at 78-79.
40. Harker, supra note 9, at 101.
41. Harker, Educating to Improve, supra note 21, at 72.
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Examination of data from New Zealand's advertising self-
regulatory body reveals a similar trend. Table 1 shows that over the
last five years the percentage of complaints not accepted have risen
from just under a quarter (24%) of those considered to nearly 40%.42
By contrast, the percentage upheld reflects the opposite trend: while
40% of complaints considered were upheld in 2000, this figure had
declined to just over a quarter (27%) in 2004. 43 The percentage of
complaints not upheld remained steady over this period at around
30%.
4 4
TABLE 1: NEW ZEALAND ADVERTISING STANDARDS
COMPLAINTS BOARD COMPLAINT OUTCOMES 2000-2004'
COMPLAINT OUTCOMES YEAR
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
TOTAL DECISIONS 315 336 419 326 459
RELEASED
2
Percentage not accepted 24 26 31 38 39
Percentage withdrawn, 6 7 4 6 5
resolved or adjourned
Percentage 40 34 32 26 27
upheld/settled
Percentage not upheld 30 34 32 29 29
Percentage not classified 0 0 * * *
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
1. Information sourced from Advertising Standards Complaints
Board Decision database.
45
2. Some decisions may relate to multiple complaints.
One interpretation of the data is that, since the percentage of
complaints upheld has tracked steadily downwards, the standards of
advertising must have improved. However, the fact that the number
42. Advertising Standards Authority Inc., Complaints Board Decision
Database, (Aug. 23, 2005), http://www.asa.co.nz/php/refdat.htm (illustrating
that of the 459 complaints decisions released in 2004, 180 were not accepted
for various reasons, most often due to a 'previous decision,' 'no jurisdiction' or
'no prima facie case'; 21 were withdrawn, resolved, no adjudication or
adjourned).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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of complaints considered has shown a slight increase, suggests this
explanation may not be correct.
Alternatively, the pattern in Table 1 may reflect the increase in
the percentage of complaints not accepted by the Chairperson of the
Complaints Board. This interpretation suggests that members of the
public have not been well informed about the various Codes of
Practice since many of the complaints were deemed to have failed to
establish a prima facie case. 46 Further investigation is necessary to
ascertain whether the criteria used to screen complaints can
accommodate the range of concerns consumers wish to raise.
More seriously, the declining percentage of complaints upheld
may indicate a difference between what members of the Complaints
Board view as offensive and what members of the public find
unacceptable. Several researchers have noted the need for Com-
plaints Board members to reflect the values and mores of the
community they represent.47 As noted earlier, the integrity of any
self-regulatory system depends on Complaints Board members'
knowledge of social values and their ability to use these values to
inform the decisions they make. 4 8 Yet, as Harker noted, the lay
representatives typically include people who have retired from
professional caregrs and, thus, whether their views and experiences
represent the concerns held by members of the general public
remains debatable.
49
If differences between consumers' concerns and the views held
by Complaints Board members exist, changes to the composition of
the Complaints Board may be necessary. This would ensure that the
board's decisions reflect fairly the social values of the general public.
In addition, there is a need for ongoing research to evaluate
knowledge of, and satisfaction with, the complaints procedure, and to
provide benchmarks of New Zealanders' values and perceptions of
"social decency" that can be used to inform decisions. Although
attention to these issues would address information gaps and improve
46. Debra Harker & Michael Harker, Dealing With Complaints About
Advertising in Australia: The Importance of Regulatory Self-Discipline, 21
INT'L J. ADVERTISING 23, 38 (2002).
47. See Debra Harker, Achieving Acceptable Advertising: An Analysis of
Advertising Regulation in Five Countries, 15 INT'L MARKETING REV. 101,
104-105 (1997).
48. See id. at 104.
49. Id.
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the Complaints Board's ability to interpret the letter of the
advertising codes the success of self-regulatory systems depends on
industry members' respect for the codes. Thus, attempts to refine the
content of codes, or the Complaints Board's interpretation of the
content of codes, will be seriously undermined if advertisers do not
embrace the spirit of the codes.
50
Given the need for industry acceptance of the codes' provisions,
the strategies identified by Harker and used by advertisers to
circumvent the codes are cause for concern. 51  These strategies
include, testing the validity of complaints as a precursor to litigation,
requiring rivals to reveal sensitive market information as part of their
defense, and damaging rivals by forcing them to amend adver-
tisements, which disrupts the original media schedule and increases
production costs.
5 2
Perhaps most seriously, however, Harker noted evidence that
advertisers would schedule controversial advertisements to coincide
with council meetings since this allowed "4 weeks of freedom and
free publicity." 53 , Harker's comments suggest some advertisers have
deliberately manipulated the media schedules developed for adver-
tisements thought likely to be controversial. The schedules have
maximized the exposure of these advertisements by timing the start
of the campaign immediately after the last Complaints Board
meeting. 54 This cynical approach to self-regulation highlights a key
reason why critics have questioned the ability of self-regulation to
maintain appropriate standards.
55
D. Outlook
In summary, although self-regulation enables an industry to
communicate standards to its members, its ability to ensure members
adhere to both the letter and the spirit of those standards is often
weak. Moreover, self-regulatory systems rarely act in a proactive
manner to restrain errant advertisers. Instead, self-regulation models
are predicated on the education of advertisers, rather than pun-
50. See id.
51. See Harker & Harker, supra note 46, at 39-40.
52. Harker, supra note 9, at 108.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Kerr & Moran, supra note 34, at 191-92.
SELF-REG ULA TION & MARKETING
ishment, as, at least in New Zealand, no direct financial penalties are
imposed on advertisers who breach the codes.
5 6
Internationally, researchers concerned about the efficacy of self-
regulation point to the tobacco industry to illustrate that self-
regulation is not robust.57  Self-regulation highlights the uneasy
tension between an organization's need to deliver profit to its
shareholders and its wider social responsibilities. The evidence to
date suggests the former typically outweighs the latter to such an
extent that additional measures are necessary to ensure that vulner-
able groups, such as children, receive adequate protection. 8
However, proponents of self-regulation suggest that the reliance
on positive reinforcement rather than punishment is not necessarily a
weakness.59  They argue that self-regulation depends on a strong
legal framework and government agencies can intervene to prosecute
recidivist offenders.6u In practice, however, such action is rare,
leading critics to question whether self-regulation provides sufficient
incentive to ensure high levels of industry compliance.
6 1
Despite their objections to restrictions on food promotions,
advertisers and food manufacturers recognize that obesity levels have
increased, and have indicated a willingness to contribute to
solutions. 62 The codes that exist appear well intentioned and com-
prehensive, and there are instances where self-regulatory bodies have
intervened to restrain advertisers.
63
56. See Harker & Wiggs, supra note 1, at 5.
57. BEN KELLEY, PUB. HEALTH ADVOCACY INST., INDUSTRY CONTROLS
OVER FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN: ARE THEY EFFECTIVE? 4 (2005),
http://www.phaionline.org/downloads/caru.analysis.pdf.
58. See id.
59. See Harker & Harker, supra note 46, at 26; Harker & Harker, supra
note 11, at 57.
60. See Harker & Harker, supra note 11, at 57.
61. See Kerr & Moran, supra note 34, at 191.
62. See generally Jeremy Irwin, Executive Dir., Ass'n of N.Z. Advertisers,
Inc., Food Industry Accord Briefing (Sept. 8, 2004), available at http://updates
.caanz.co.nz/attachments/food-accord-briefing-8-sept-04.pdf (stating that the
key objectives of the Association of New Zealand Advertisers, Inc. are
reducing obesity, improving nutrition, increasing physical activity, and
working towards a cross-Tasman industry approach to obesity).
63. See NAT'L ADVER. REVIEW COUNCIL, WHITE PAPER: GUIDANCE FOR
FOOD ADVERTISING SELF-REGULATION 34 (2004), available at http://www
.narcpartners.org/reports/whitepaper.asp.
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Even in the United States, however, the percentage of adver-
tisements that have attracted self-regulators' attention remains low.
64
Thus, while it is difficult to argue that self-regulators have done
nothing, the question of whether their interventions have been
sufficient to protect children remains debatable. One observer com-
menting on U.S. regulation of children's advertising noted that the
"[Children's Advertising Review Unit] says it is a watchdog, but it is
empowered to do things so small you need a scanning electron
microscope to see it."
65
On-going concerns over the extent to which the codes
circumscribe corporate behavior have become more serious,
especially where the groups likely to be adversely affected by lower
than desirable industry compliance are themselves vulnerable.
66
Similarly, where the outcome of promotional activities contributes to
social or health problems, critics have questioned whether self-
regulation can provide a sufficiently disinterested level of super-
vision.
67
These concerns have coalesced as health researchers, child
advocates, and doctors have documented the growing incidence of
obesity-related disorders among young children. 68 In the past, few
children were regarded as clinically obese; today around thirty
percent of children are deemed severely overweight.69 Indeed, some
64. Id. at 33-38 (stating that some seventy-nine decisions, eighteen
involving food, were published between 1975 and 1979; 159 decisions, sixteen
of which involved food, were published in the 1980s; 48 formal cases, 4
involving food, were published in the 1990s, although 434 informal cases, 50
involving food, were also published in this decade).
65. Caroline E. Mayer, Minding Nemo; Pitches to Kids Feed Debate About
a Watchdog, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2005, at FO, available at
http://www.commercialalert.org/issues-article.php?article-id=338&subcategor
y_id=69&category=l (quoting Gary Ruskin, Executive Director of Com-
mercial Alert).
66. See SUSTAIN, ALLIANCE FOR BETTER FOOD & FARMING, THE
CHILDREN'S FOOD BILL: WHY WE NEED A NEW LAW, NOT MORE
VOLUNTARY APPROACHES 3, 8-9 (2005), available at http://www.sustainweb.
org/CFBMpReport.pdf (stating that children are particularly vulnerable to
food advertising).
67. See id. at 13.
68. See CTR. FOR SCI. & THE PUB. INTEREST, PESTERING PARENTS: HOW
FOOD COMPANIES MARKET OBESITY TO CHILDREN (2003), available at
http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/pagesfrompesteringparents final-pt I.pdf.
69. Anthony Maher, Nick Wilson & Louise Signal, Advertising and
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estimates are that obesity among children could exceed fifty percent
in 2020 if current trends continue.70 Both the short and long-term
consequences of obesity have focused researchers' attention on
factors that are likely to contribute to obesity, including marketing
communications. 71  The following Part examines how marketing
communications work, and the particular effects they may have on
children's eating behaviors.
III. MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS AND OBESITY
Although researchers continue to debate how marketing commu-
nications affect consumers' behavior, the effects of promotional
activity are more easily observed.72 Advertising, sales promotions
and the range of other communication tools available to marketers
reinforce existing behaviors and provide stimuli that assist the
introduction of new behavior patterns. 73 In the following section, the
analysis draws upon behavior modification theory and Professor
Andrew Ehrenberg's "weak" theory of advertising, which was
informed by behavior modification theory. The "weak" theory of
advertising is a well documented and empirically supported model of
marketing communications.
74
Availability of 'Obesogenic' Foods Around NZ Secondary Schools: A Pilot
Study, 118 N.Z. MED. J. 1556, 1556 (2005), available at http://www.
nzma.org.nz/journal/1 18-1218; see also I4NISTRY OF HEALTH, NZ FOOD NZ
CHILDREN: KEY RESULTS OF THE 2002 NATIONAL CHILDREN'S NUTRITION
SURVEY, at xxii (2003), available at http://www.moh.govt.nzlmoh.nsf/0/0642
34A7283A0478CC256DD60000AB4C/$File/nzfoodnzchildren.pdf (indicating
results of survey evincing an increase in obese children in New Zealand); Am.
Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Prevention of Pediatric Overweight and
Obesity, 112 PEDIATRICS 424, 424 (2003) (specifying that over fifteen percent
of U.S. children are obese).
70. ROYAL COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, RCP RESPONSE TO CHOOSING HEALTH:
OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY (2004), http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/college/state
ments/response-choosehealth-obesity.aspv.
71. See K.A. Coon & K.L. Tucker, Television and Children's Consumption
Patterns, 54 MINERVA PEDIATRICA (Italy) 423, 423 (2002); Jason Halford et
al., Effect of Television Advertisements for Foods on Food Consumption in
Children, 42 APPETITE 221, 221-22 (2004).
72. ROBERT EAST, THE EFFECT OF ADVERTISING AND DISPLAY: ASSESSING
THE EVIDENCE 52-54 (2003).
73. Id.
74. See Andrew Ehrenberg, Repetitive Advertising and the Consumer, 14 J.
ADVERTISING RES. 25, 31-32 (1974).
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A. Behavior Modification Theory
Behavior modification theory views marketing activities as
environmental interventions that may cue new behaviors or maintain
existing behaviors in the face of competitors' promotions.75 Activ-
ities that stimulate new behaviors include value-added promotions
that increase the overall appeal of a particular item.76 As well as
enhancing the value delivered by a product, interventions also
include signage that increases the visibility of particular products,
making them easier to recognize among a product array.
77
B. Common Marketing Tactics
1. Price Discounts
Common examples of marketing tactics that stimulate purchase
behavior include sales promotions such as price discounts.78 These
promotions prompt trial of new menu items by providing better value
than that offered by other menu items or by competitors' products.
Stimulating trial of new items is a form of cross-selling that attempts
to broaden the range of products consumers purchase from a partic-
ular supplier. Other things being equal, the more products con-
sumers purchase from a single supplier, the less likely they are to
defect to another supplier. Thus, the continuous refinement of menu
offerings and the release of limited-period special items help
maintain variety from a consumer's perspective and provide
incentives to revisit the outlet.
75. See Walter R. Nord & J. Paul Peter, A Behavior Modification
Perspective on Marketing, 44 J. MARKETING 36, 36-37 (1980).
76. See id. at 39.
77. See id. at 40.
78. See, e.g., Roy Beth Kelley, Case Note, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
American Drugs, Inc.: Drawing the Line Between Predatory and Competitive
Pricing, 50 ARK. L. REV. 103, 103 (1997) (stating that a court has found Wal-
Mart's below-cost pricing legally enhanced competition).
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2. Bundling
Promotions may also increase usage of complementary menu
items by "bundling" these into enhanced value offerings.79
"Bundling" occurs when a range of menu items are offered at a price
that is lower than the sum of the individual unit prices of the bundled
items. For consumers, bundling promotions foster the purchase of
multiple items since the "bundle" represents better unit value than
the purchase of one item alone.
If bundling promotions are routinely available to consumers,
they may foster the development of a habit; that is, consumers may
regularly purchase "bundled" items because these are known to
provide better value. Although sales promotions are not inherently
unhealthy, the fact that larger serving sizes are frequently associated
with the best value discounts seems likely to skew purchases towards
these items. This, in turn, stimulates and supports the consumption
of larger serving sizes which, if not matched by increased energy
expenditure, will contribute to obesity.
3. Competitions
Competitions also maintain and increase consumption rates by
setting entry criteria that must be met by a certain date. 80 Many
competitions require multiple purchases before the entry qualifies.
79. See, e.g., Suzanne Kapner, Shopping Spree-Stores Hoping Black Friday
Sales Mean Green, N.Y. POST, Nov. 24, 2005, at 043 (providing an example of
bundling where retailers lure customers after Thanksgiving with special "door-
buster" deals, where products are sold at a lower price for a limited time with
the hope the customers will stay and shop for other items at full price); Pizza
Marketing Quarterly, How Appetizing is Your Menu?, http://www.
pmq.com/mag/2002spring/appetizer.shtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2006)
(providing an example of bundling where Domino's has offered to customers
that they can add a soda and a side to build an entire meal for the family at a
lower cost than buying each item individually).
80. See, e.g., Press Release, PR Newswire Ass'n LLC, A Millionaire,
Movie Store, and Complete Home Makeover to Emerge From New Monopoly
Best Chance Game 3.0 at McDonald's: McDonald's and Best Buy Team Up to
Offer McDonald's Customers $200 Million in Prizes (Oct. 4, 2005) (stating the
criteria for entry as purchase of Large Fries, Medium and Large Soft Drinks,
Hash Browns, three and five piece Chicken Selects, and new Premium Chicken
Sandwiches); McDonald's, http://monopoly.promotions.com/monopoly/front
.do (last visited Dec. 1, 2005) (stating that the monopoly Best Chance Game
3.0 ended Nov. 15, 2005).
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Where the competition entry period extends over only a short period
of time, potential entrants have a clear incentive to ensure their
consumption levels are such that they meet the entry criterion.
Therefore, these promotions are likely to support an increase in
consumption levels (consumers will buy multiple qualifying items)
or an increase in the frequency of consumption (consumers will eat
at the outlet sponsoring the competition more frequently). These
changes in behavior are likely to occur for a sustained period of time
(until the competition closes), thus, consumers may develop new
habits that are maintained even after the competition ends. Where
the changed behavior involves increased consumption, the potential
for it to contribute to obesity is clear.
4. Loyalty Programs
The same reasoning applies to loyalty programs that provide
incentives to purchase in order to complete a particular collection of
items.8 ' These programs appeal to children's desire for collectible
items and have the potential to stimulate increased sales for the
duration of the promotion (normally at least four weeks). 2
Many loyalty programs are directed explicitly at young children
and are linked with merchandise featuring characters from recently
released movies. The use of characters such as Sponge Bob Square-
pants, Harry Potter, and Batman are clearly designed to appeal to
children and will prompt them to ask their parents to buy the
merchandise-linked items.
8 3
Loyalty promotions associate premiums with specific menu
items and run for a period of weeks. During this time, the premium
on an offer is changed, normally on a weekly basis; this frequent
updating of the free item provides an incentive for children to revisit
the outlet and repurchase the menu item so they acquire the entire
collection offered. One commentator noted that "McDonald's, the
world's biggest food service retailer, with a turnover of $40 billion,
81. Amy Johannes, Burger King Rolls Out Star Wars Themed Gift Cards,
Toy Premiums, PROMO, Nov. 23, 2005, http://promomagazine.com/premiums/
bkstarwars_112305/index.html (stating Burger King launched the gift-card
program to build brand loyalty among customers and drive trial with gift card
recipients and to drive purchases with kids by offering premiums of six
watches and seventeen toys with kids' meals).
82. See CTR. FOR SC. & THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 68, at 26.
83. See id. at 25-26.
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has harnessed the pulling-power of icon characters from films,
television, computer games, cartoon strips and the toy trade and
turned buying hamburgers into a fetish.,
8 4
The types of promotions outlined above hold wide appeal to
young people, as they offer added value and make the unit price of
particular menu items more attractive when purchased in conjunction
with other items. Children's increasing spending power has been
well documented. 5 Yet, because children have limited incomes,
promotions that offer high unit value are likely to prove very
attractive.
C. The Effect of Food Advertising on Child Obesity
The prior section has highlighted the wide range of marketing
communications now directed at children. Sales promotions offer
added value, either by increasing the size of the menu item or by
adding a free gift, and provide an incentive to purchase, and to
continue purchasing. However, in addition to stimulating purchase
behavior, marketing communications also reinforce and maintain
existing behavior patterns through operant conditioning.
According to Professor Ehrenberg, repetitive advertisin 's main
role is to reinforce already developed, repeat-buying habits. This,
in turn, preserves that brand's salience and, thus, the likelihood that
consumers will buy it again when next making a purchase in that
product category. Therefore, children's exposure to advertisements
for food products is likely to both stimulate their requests for
particular items (where these are associated with premiums) and
ensure that they continue to purchase and request items with which
they are already familiar.
Because advertising can play a key role in supporting and
maintaining behavior patterns, researchers have undertaken detailed
analyses of children's exposure to food advertising. Researchers
have found that as the range of promotions directed at children has
84. John Windsor, No Accounting for Taste, OBSERVER U.K., Mar. 25,
2001, http://www.mcspotlight.org/media/press/mcds/observer250301 .html.
85. Allison Stein Wellner, Tiny Hands on Big Purse Strings, FORECAST,
Dec. 2002, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOGDE/is 12 22/ai_94
982883/print.
86. Ehrenberg, supra note 74, at 32.
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increased, so has their exposure to food marketing.
8 7
Recent research by Krista Kotz and Mary Story suggests that
around half of the advertisements screened during children's
television hours feature food products.8 8  Furthermore, primetime
programs that children watch also contain a high proportion of food
advertisements.8 9 Researchers have also identified an increase in the
number of food advertisements screened; recent estimates suggest
that American children are exposed to more than 40,000 food
advertisements a year.
90
The foods promoted during programs regularly viewed by
children are typically high in fat, salt or sugar, and are regarded by
nutritionists as low in nutritional value to children. 91 Kotz and Story
concluded that "[t]he diet presented on Saturday morning television
is the antithesis of what is recommended for healthful eating for
children."
92
More recently, an analysis by the Australian Divisions of
General Practice found that over ninety-nine percent of food
advertisements screened during children's programs featured these
types of food products. 93 By contrast, promotions designed to foster
healthy eating behaviors were conspicuously absent. 4 A recent
study conducted in the United States concluded that food advertising
during children's television programs could strongly influence their
snacking behavior since these programs screen after school and
87. See Leonie Neville et al., Food Advertising on Australian Television:
The Extent of Children's Exposure, 20 HEALTH PROMOTION INT'L. 105, 108
(2005); see also Kay Hammond et al., The Extent and Nature of Televised
Food Advertising to New Zealand Children and Adolescents, 23 AUSTL. &
N.Z. J. PUB. HEALTH. 49, 51 (1999) (finding a high percentage of food
advertising during primetime television hours in Australia and New Zealand).
88. Krista Kotz & Mary Story, Food Advertisements During Children's
Saturday Morning Television Programming: Are They Consistent with Dietary
Recommendations?, 94 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS'N 1296, 1297 (1994).
89. See id.
90. Dale Kunkel, Children and Television Advertising, in HANDBOOK OF
CHILDREN AND THE MEDIA 375, 376 (Dorothy Singer & Jerome Singer eds.,
2001).
91. See Kotz & Story, supra note 88, at 1297.
92. See id. at 1296.
93. AUSTRALIAN DIv. OF GEN. PRACTICE, WHAT ARE WE FEEDING OUR
CHILDREN? A JUNK FOOD ADVERTISING AUDIT (Feb. 2003), http://www.adgp
.com.au/client images/1245.pdf.
94. See id.
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before the evening meal.95
The number of high fat, salt and sugar food advertisements
children are exposed to is a cause for concern, as are the techniques
used in these promotions. Advertisements directed at children often
use animation and fantasy and draw heavily on emotional, rather
than factual, appeals.96 By engaging children at an emotional rather
than cognitive level, this type of advertising seems unlikely to
prompt any consideration of the nutritional value of the food
promoted, the rate at which it should be consumed, or the conse-
quences of excessive consumption.
D. The Effect of Promotional Techniques on Child Obesity
However, it is not simply children's exposure to food adver-
tising that has concerned health researchers. The range of promo-
tional techniques used by food marketers engages children in a way
that is very likely to make them less receptive to messages about
healthy eating.97 Promotions that feature characters from children's
television programs or movies are clearly targeted at children.
Recent studies have noted a strong growth in licensing arrangements
between snack food manufacturers and owners of character trade-
marks.9S The range of food items now associated with children's
characters has also diversified. Whereas these characters were once
found primarily on children's cereals, they now appear on snack food
bars, ice cream, fast food items, and confections. Indeed, one recent
study reported that as many as one in six food promotions included a
free toy offer.
99
95. Katherine Coon et al., Relationships Between Use of Television During
Meals and Children's Food Consumption Patterns, 107 PEDIATRICS 1, 5
(2001), http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/107/1/ef.
96. See MK Lewis & AJ Hill, Food Advertising on British Children's
Television: A Content Analysis and Experimental Study with Nine-Year Olds,
22 INT'L. J. OBESITY 206, 207 (1998).
97. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
98. See Kaiser Family Foundation, The Role of Media in Childhood
Obesity, ISSUE BRIEF (Kaiser Family Found., Menlo Park, Cal.), Feb. 2004, at
6, available at http://www.kff.org/entmedia/entmedia022404pkg.cfn.
99. See id.
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1. Web Sites
As new forms of media have developed and new techniques for
utilizing existing media have evolved, marketing communications to
children have become both more sophisticated and more engaging.
Many food companies host Web sites designed specifically for
children. 00  These sites involve clubs and games, together with
promotions for specific meal items and details of the premiums
available with these promotions. 1 1 Other links include coloring-in
pages featuring characters and trademarks associated with the brand,
recipes involving the manufacturer's products, screensavers, and
competitions. 0 2 A recent research paper identified more than fifty
links to pages designed to appeal to children on one company's Web
site; each page was associated with one of the company's brands.' 
03
In many cases, the promotions featured on these pages are no
less blatant than the sales promotions outlined above. However,
even the more subtle associations clearly reinforce and maintain the
salience of specific brand names, menu items, and premiums.
Marketers' association of high fat, salt and sugar foods with fun
experiences is not balanced by information about appropriate and
healthy consumption levels.104 As a result, children receive sophis-
ticated messages promoting brands and linking these to positive
experiences and outcomes, but little or no information about the
frequency with which these foods should be consumed, or the need
to eat a wider range of foods to ensure a healthy diet.
100. McDonald's New Zealand, http://www.mcdonalds.co.nz/fun_games.
htm (containing a link to the United States "www.Ronald.com" page that
featured details of "Happy Meal" items together with a disclaimer in size 7.5
Arial font: "HEY KIDS, THIS IS ADVERTISING."); see also Sustain, Snagged
in the Web: Advertising Junk Food to Children on the Internet, http://www.
sustainweb.org/child addintro.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) (displaying a
number of food marketing techniques directed at children).
101. McDonald's New Zealand, supra note 100.
102. Id.
103. See CTR. FOR SCI. & THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 68, at 20.
104. See AUSTRALIAN DIvs. OF GEN. PRACTICE, Junk Food Audit, supra
note 93.
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2. Product Placement
While Web sites are sometimes clearly linked to a particular
manufacturer or brand, other promotions are more subtle and less
easily avoided. Numerous researchers have documented the growth
in product placement, a marketing strategy that the paid inclusion of
brands in television shows or movies.105 Initially utilized by the
tobacco industry, product placement is now a multi-million dollar
business that offers advantages not associated with advertising.
Brands featured as an integral part of a movie or television
program, rather than something featured in a discrete promotion, are
considerably more difficult to avoid. Viewers are normally unwill-
ing to fast-forward through program material, assuming they are
aware that it contains brand promotions. Researchers have ques-
tioned the extent to which viewers are even aware of brand
placements, and thus, whether they are fully aware of the commercial
stimuli they are receiving.10 6 Given that children are typically less
aware of advertising's commercial focus and have greater difficulty
in separating program content from advertisements, the use of
product placements further blurs this distinction and capitalizes on
children's less developed cognitive skills.10 7 Even older, more dis-
cerning, children are less likely to reason against product placement,
particularly when the brands are carefully integrated with the
characters' lifestyles and behaviors.'0 8
Furthermore, use of brands by actors young people admire can
also enhance that brand's appeal. The resulting increase in popu-
larity of that brand is likely to provide additional reinforcement to
users and may even induce trial among non-users. 10 9 Dr. Wootan
notes that "[p]roduct placements create and reinforce social norms
regarding the product. They also undermine parental responsibility
and control because they cannot be skipped over and avoided."' "10
105. Alain d'Astous & Francis Chartier, A Study of Factors Affecting Con-
sumer Evaluations and Memory of Product Placements in Movies, 22 J.
CURRENT ISSUES & RES. ADVERTISING 31, 31 (2000).
106. Seeid. at39.
107. CTR. FOR SCI. & THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 68, at 21, 35.
108. See d'Astous & Chartier, supra note 105, at 39.
109. See CTR. FOR SCI. & THE PUB. INTEREST, supra note 68, at 22, 36.
110. Id. at22.
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Recent examples of product placement include McDonald's
offer to pay rappers if they incorporate the words "Big Mac" into
their songs."' Additionally, young people playing the popular com-
puter game "The Sims" can shop at McDonald's with their charac-
ters."12 Also, Coca-Cola has invested heavily in teenage television
promotions:
In one of television's broadest and most blatant advertising
gambits in recent years, Coca-Cola Co. has committed
millions of dollars to saturate the fledgling drama ['Young
Americans'] with commercials and product placement.
When 'Young Americans', an hour-long weekly series
about teens at an elite small-town prep school, starts its
eight-week run tonight, viewers may be hard-pressed to
figure out where the drama ends and the product-pitching
begins."1
3
Recent research suggests that these promotions reinforce current
purchasing behavior. 11 An experiment that exposed children to
different versions of a movie, one of which included a scene showing
Pepsi-Cola, found children who saw the product placement were
significantly more likely to select Pepsi-Cola when invited to choose
between Pepsi-Cola or Coca-Cola."1
5
Promotions such as these incorporate brands into young people's
everyday experiences, thereby entrenching those brands as a normal
part of those experiences. Their influence is more pervasive, and
arguably more difficult to counter, because such promotions are
covert and virtually impossible to avoid. Moreover, the widespread
reinforcement of these brands in "normal" environments suggests the
brands are part of a regular diet, even though nutritionists argue these
111. See Jonathan Duffy, Well Placed, BBC NEWS MAG. (U.K.), Mar. 30,
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4391955.stm.
112. See Tor Thorsen, Advertising in Games, GAMESPOT, Dec. 9, 2002,
http://www.gamespot.com/ps2/adventure/truecrimestreetsoflalprintable_60819
17.html.
113. Joe Flint, TV's New Teen Drama Gives Starring Role to Coke-What $6
Million Can Buy: Soft Drink Is Everywhere In WB's Prep-School Saga, WALL
ST. J., July 12, 2000, at B1, available at http://www.commercialalert.org/wb-
cola2.htm.
114. See Susan Auty & Charlie Lewis, Exploring Children's Choice: The
Reminder Effect of Product Placement, 21 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 697, 706
(2004).
115. See id.
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foods have limited value and that regular consumption at the expense
of more nutritious foods is damaging."1
6
For at least a decade, researchers have questioned the ethics of
promotions that' transpose commercial messages into program
content. 1 7 Professor Siva Balasubramanian highlights these issues,
explaining that "[b]ecause they are paid for, hybrid messages provide
a basis for the sponsor to control key message aspects such as its
content and format; because they covertly or overtly disguise their
commercial origins, hybrid messages may appear believable."
1 18
Balasubramanian also notes that unlike advertisements, which
typically screen for only thirty or sixty seconds, product placements
may appear throughout a show, thus increasing brand reinforce-
ment. 19 In addition, associating celebrities with featured brands
enhances the potential for vicarious learning or modeling by chil-
dren, and encourages them to acquire consumption behaviors that
will benefit the promoted brand.1 20 Where the behaviors may con-
tribute to health problems, they become of particular concern
because product placements rarely feature any information that might
balance the implied sales message.
Although this section has drawn on only a small number of the
many marketing strategies employed by food manufacturers who
advertise to children, it is clear that children's media contains
numerous food promotions. Today's food promotions are diverse in
format and have evolved into subtle, less obtrusive communications
116. See Waitemata Dist. Health Bd., Drink Guidelines a First in Child
Obesity Battle, May 25, 2005, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/GE0505/S00
189.htm (noting that "one in three New Zealand children are overweight or
obese and more than a quarter of an average child's daily sugar intake comes
directly from what they drink."); DIABETES N.Z. & FIGHT THE OBESITY
EPIDEMIC, INC., CUTING THE FAT: HOW A FAT TAX CAN HELP FIGHT
OBESITY 10 (2004), available at http://diabetes.org.nz/resources/files/CutFat
Aug04.doc (noting that thirty percent of deaths in New Zealand are attributable
to dietary factors, and that illnesses related to diet include type 2 diabetes, heart
disease, stroke, and cancer).
117. See Siva K. Balasubramanian, Beyond Advertising and Publicity:
Hybrid Messages and Public Policy Issues, 23 J. ADVERTISING 29, 30-31
(1994).
118. Id. at30.
119. See id. at38.
120. See id. at 38; Barbara Baerns, Separating Advertising Content from
Programme Content: The Principle and Its Relevance in Communications
Practice, 8 J. OF COMM. MGMT. 101, 102 (2003).
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that policy researchers suggest children may be less likely to
recognize as commercials.
12
E. Outlook
In summary, marketing promotions stimulate purchase behavior,
foster consumption of larger-sized menu items, and provide
immediate rewards, such as giveaways, that reinforce purchase
behavior. Over time, cueing and maintaining behavior in this way
will support the development of long-term habits.
In some cases, those habits may not be associated with any
adverse health consequences; however, where they support the view
that frequent consumption of high fat, salt and sugar foods are
consistent with a healthy diet, the potential for them to contribute to
obesity is clear. Moreover, the wide array of media used to promote
value for money offerings may encourage beliefs that these foods are
not unhealthy, irrespective of the frequency with which they are
consumed or the size of the portions consumed.
These promotions have evolved under the current self-regulatory
regimes. This Article now considers whether this form of adver-
tising regulation sufficiently protects children. Like many countries,
New Zealand is currently considering how best to manage the health
problems associated with an increasingly obese population. The
following Part examines and reviews New Zealand's approach to
self-regulation.
IV. SELF REGULATION OF FOOD MARKETING AND MARKETING TO
CHILDREN: AN EXPERIENCE FROM NEW ZEALAND
Like their overseas counterparts, New Zealand food and
advertising industry representatives are determined to ensure that the
self-regulatory codes remain as liberal as possible. 122 The Adver-
tising Standards Authority draws on the United Nation's Convention
on the Rights of the Child to construct an argument that suggests
restrictions on advertising would encroach upon children's rights:
"Article 13 recognizes the child's right to freedom of expression.
'This right shall include the freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds.' Children therefore have the right
121. See Auty & Lewis, supra note 114, at 710.
122. Harker, Educating to Improve, supra note 21, at 70.
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to receive advertisements along with other information."'' 23
The view that advertisements directed at children ensure their
right to access information may surprise health researchers who more
typically view advertising as a tool designed to achieve commercial
objectives. Other arguments in defense of advertising to children
have much in common with the arguments used to oppose
restrictions on tobacco promotions. For example, the Communi-
cation Agencies' Association of New Zealand (CAANZ) outlined its
role as providing "leadership in the defense of the right to
promote."1
24
Opponents of restrictions on advertising and promotion rely
heavily upon a "legal to sell, legal to promote" argument. For
example, Professor Tim Ambler argues that advertising restrictions
will serve no useful purpose, having, he claims, previously been
unsuccessful in reducing alcohol misuse. 25 He suggests that envi-
ronmental factors, such as the behavior of parents and peers, which
themselves reflect deeper social and cultural norms, will more
powerfully influence young people's food consumption.'
26
In New Zealand, the advertising industry has been quick to
frame the debate as an issue of freedom concerning the extent to
which governments should adopt a paternalistic approach to regu-
lation.127 The food industry's public relations consultant declared
that the key issue in the debate was "the extent to which the state
should intervene in peoples [sic] lives by determining what they can
and can't--or should and shouldn't eat."'
128
These claims evoke concerns that the government plans to erode
fundamental democratic freedoms and deflects attention away from
123. Adver. Standards Auth., CODE FOR ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN, (Feb.
1, 2005), http://www.asa.co.nz/codes/codes.htm.
124. MARK CHAMPION, COMMC'N AGENCIES' ASS'N, SUBMISSION ON THE
ADVERTISING STANDARDS AUTHORITY'S REVIEW OF ITS CHILDREN AND FOOD
CODES 1 (2005), available at http://updates.caanz.co.nz/attachments/asacodes
subfinal.pdf.
125. See Tim Ambler, Do We Really Want to Be Ruled by Fatheads?, 5
INT'L. J. ADVERTISING & MARKETING TO CHILDREN 25, 26 (2004).
126. See id. at 28 (noting that the sedentary nature of television watching,
together with family lifestyles, may account for obesity).
127. KEVIN RAMSHAW, WELLINGTON PERSPECTIVE: PRESENTATION To
CAANZ 49, 51 (2004), available at http://updates.caanz.co.nz/attachments/
food-accord-briefing-8-sept-04.pdf.
128. See id.
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the real debate over the ethics and effects of food promotions aimed
at children. To support arguments that government intervention is
unwarranted, opponents of restrictions argue there is little or no
evidence that they are necessary. For example, CAANZ interprets
the low number of complaints relating to the Codes for Food
Advertising and the Code for Advertising to Children as evidence
that "there is a high level of... compliance with the codes [and] ...
a level of comfort among consumers of advertising that the
promotion of products to children is being handled responsibly by
advertisers, media and agencies."'
129
This argument is illogical for several reasons. It assumes that
the public fully understands the complaints process and believes that
complaints made will be processed fairly. Yet, there is no evidence
on the ASA Web site of research that has tested public awareness
and knowledge of the complaints system or that has explored
complainants' satisfaction with the complaints system. 30 Without
empirical support, it is difficult to rely upon industry claims that
consumers are satisfied with the type and level of advertising
currently featured in the media. Furthermore, the extent to which
adult audiences overlap with children's programming is unknown. If
the level of overlap is low and few parents watch children's
television, their alleged satisfaction with the advertising content
cannot be assumed.
Another argument supporting self-regulation of food advertising
directed at children is that the advertising will soon be balanced by
greater latitude in the claims that advertisers may make about food
products. Once advertisers may make health claims about foods, the
argument asserts, the availability of this new information will ensure
consumers are better equipped to make healthy choices.13' This
argument assumes, however, that the health claims themselves will
be based on sound science and presented in a format accessible to
consumers. The U.S. experience suggests this may be a wishful
assumption. 1
32
129. CHAMPION, supra note 124, at 3.
130. Adver. Standards Auth., http:www.asa.co.nz/ (last visited Oct. 18,
2005).
131. CHAMPION, supra note 124, at 5.
132. Government Role in Combating Obesity: Hearing on HR. 3444 and
H.R. 2987 Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 2-3
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Further, the health food argument explicitly assumes that
advertisements of fresh fruits and vegetables will increase once
suppliers of these products are able to make health claims about
them. This assumption overlooks the fact that, as unprocessed pro-
ducts, fresh fruits and vegetables are not value-added items. As a
result, their marketing budgets are small to nonexistent.
More generally, advertisers argue that obesity is a complex
problem that requires a multi-faceted approach. 133 They describe
proposals to restrict or ban promotional activities as "simple, silver-
bullet solution[s]" that are unlikely to achieve any benefits.
34
However, this reasoning implies that until health researchers have
identified the precise role played by each factor known to be
correlated with obesity, no interventions should occur. Dr. Wootan
highlights the flaw in this reasoning, explaining that "U]ust because
there are other contributors doesn't mean we shouldn't address the
most important of those contributors .... I think marketing is at the
top of the list."'
135
The World Health Organization (WHO) also argues that there is
enough evidence to suggest that heavy marketing of energy dense
foods and fast food outlets contributes to increased risk of weight
gain and obesity.' 36 While the evidence connecting marketing with
obesity is not unequivocal, WHO experts are satisfied that the causal
link is probable, therefore, marketing communications are an
appropriate target for intervention. 
137
To counter these arguments, proponents of self-regulation in
New Zealand and elsewhere create doubt about their opponents'
claims. Where advertisers can create sufficient doubt about the size
or scope of problems, or the efficacy of proposed solutions, they
often avoid government regulation. Professors David Michaels and
(2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Bruce Silverglade, Dir. of Legal
Affairs Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest), available at http://www.cspinet.org/
new/pdf/GovReftsy.pdf.
133. See NAT'L ADVER. REVIEW COUNCIL, supra note 63, at 27.
134. Jenny Robertson, Food Giants Worry Over Charges Their Products
Damage Children's Health, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 28, 2005, http://
www.organicconsumers.org/school/giantsworry013105.cfm.
135. Id.
136. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., DIET, NUTRITION AND THE PREVENTION OF
CHRONIC DISEASES: TECHNICAL REPORT 916, at 65 (2003).
137. Id.
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Celeste Monforton refer to this phenomenon as the "manufacture of
uncertainty," a process designed to reduce the pressure for regulators
to act. 138 Although Michaels and Monforton examine the tobacco
industry's use of this strategy, the parallels with food manufacturers
and advertisers are striking. Food manufacturers and advertisers
dispute the influence of marketing activities on behavior, particularly
posited causal relationships, and argue that more research is required
before policy interventions can be supported. 1
39
Food manufacturers and advertisers dismiss empirical evidence
and reasoned argument as "junk science" or mere "personal
opinion," which, as Professors Gary Edmond and David Mercer
noted, means little more than "I don't like your study."' 40 Moreover,
the term "junk science" implies that real science will be able to arrive
at an objective and indisputable truth. By contrast, scientists them-
selves recognize that "absolute scientific certainty is both counter-
productive and futile.'
141
The arguments presented by the New Zealand advertising
industry have, thus far, been very successful in avoiding government
regulation. The New Zealand Minister of Health has publicly
endorsed an industry document known as the "Food Industry
Accord" (FIA), which commits industry signatories to work to
address obesity while allowing them to protect all the marketing
freedoms that contribute to obesity. 142 One critic summed up health
researchers' attitudes about the accord: "The food industry accord
has as much chance of turning the tide of childhood obesity as King
Canute."'
143
In the year that has elapsed since the launch of the FIA, the food
industry has run a television campaign featuring Willie Munchright
138. See David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Manufacturing Uncertainty:
Contested Science and the Protection of the Public's Health and Environment,
95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, at s39 (2005).
139. See id. at s40.
140. See generally Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing Junk Science,
1998 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (explaining how the term "junk science" reduces
very complex issues to mere technicalities).
141. Michaels & Monforton, supra note 138, at s45.
142. See N.Z. FOOD INDUS. ACCORD, THE HEALTH OF OUR NATION (2004).
http://www.nztbc.co.nz/images/foodind-accord.pdf.
143. See Press Release, Sue Kedgley, N.Z. Green Party, Burger Barons
Hijack Obesity Campaign (Sept. 3, 2004), available at http://www.greens.org
.nz/searchdocs/PR7830.html.
SELF-REGULATION & MARKETING
(an unbranded McDonald's character promoting healthy eating), and
undertaken an ongoing review of the Codes for Advertising to
Children and the Code for Food Advertising.144 Other initiatives are
said to be underway, though no tangible outputs are yet apparent.
During this same year, Coca-Cola has launched a teen music Web
site, and McDonald's has sponsored school dental vans via the
brand's Ronald McDonald House. 145 These recent marketing initia-
tives have not allayed concerns that the food industry is unable to
place health concerns above corporate self-interest.
V. CONCLUSION
The evidence from New Zealand and elsewhere suggests
governments can no longer afford to experiment with self-regulatory
schemes that have overseen a rapid growth in promotions directed at
children. These promotions have taken a myriad of forms. Some are
more blatant and intrusive while others are more subtle and difficult
to detect. Overall, the prevalence of these promotions suggests that
self-regulatory codes have failed to adequately balance the
commercial drive for profit against the need to meet high standards
of social responsibility.14
6
The need for government intervention is urgent, and the lack of
legal authority on food promotions directed at children must be
addressed. 147  Only the government can regulate trade practices
described as creating a "hostile food environment" and intervene to
"remedy the gross information imbalance that leads many
consumers, especially children, to adopt a less healthful diet.'
4 8
The current range of food promotions reveals the inherent
weakness of self-regulation, particularly the lack of clarity in the
144. Geoff Cumming, The Fight Against Junk Food, N.Z. HERALD, Jan.
10, 2005, http:www.nzherald.co.nz/section/story.cfm?cid=2&objectid=10348
103.
145. See Coketunes Music Download Store, http://www.cokefridge.co.nz'
index.sm (last visited Sept. 6, 2005); Ronald McDonald House Charities,
http://www.rmhc.tx.co.nz/programmes/index.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
146. See Letter from Ben Kelley, Bd. Member, Pub. Health Advocacy Inst.,
to Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n (May 31, 2005), available at
http://www.phaionline.org/downloads/blog/phai.ftc.comments.pdf.
147. See BEN KELLEY, PUB. HEALTH ADVOCACY INST., INDUSTRY
CONTROLS OVER FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN: ARE THEY EFFECTIVE? 3
(2005), available at, http://www.phaionline.org/downloads/caru.analysis.pdf.
148. See Hearing, supra note 132.
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code provisions, which creates ambiguity and loopholes that
manufacturers and advertisers are quick to exploit.
149
Industry arguments that consumers are satisfied with food
advertising and the promotions directed at children are illogical and
lack empirical support. Claims that parents need to take more
responsibility for their children's diets and exercise habits also
deflect attention away from the role the food and advertising
industries play in shaping and reinforcing children's dietary habits.
Nor can the argument that there is no such thing as "healthy"
and "unhealthy" foods be accepted, as "[t]his is tantamount to saying
that all foods, however bad their nutritional quality, can fit into a
balanced diet, piovided that you hardly ever eat them. Unfor-
tunately, children eat large amounts of junk food and all too fre-
quently food promotions to children are dominated by these
products.", so
Food marketing to children is only logical if it maintains or
reinforces behavior, or increases the rate at which this is exhibited.
Recent evidence also challenges claims that food marketing has little
effect on behavior and suggests promotions directed at children do
influence their behavior. 51 Given the marketing activities, and the
evidence of their effects on young people, governments can no
longer rely on the food and advertising industries to control the food
promotions they direct to children.
While interventions such as education to improve children's
knowledge of healthy food choices may be proposed as alternatives
to regulation, these are unlikely to have a meaningful effect in a
media environment dominated by messages promoting foods high in
fat, salt and sugar. Only regulatory interventions that restrict food
promotions can create an environment in which education and social
marketing messages are effective, and where young people's ability
to make healthy choices is enhanced.
149. See SUSTAIN, FOOD & FARMING, supra note 66, at 13.
150. Id. at 14.
151. See FOOD STANDARDS AGENCY, REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON THE
EFFECTS OF FOOD PROMOTION TO CHILDREN 137 (2003), available at http://
www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/foodpromotiontochildrenl .pdf.
